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Abstract 
This paper examines innovations to religious and non-religious service provision by religious 
organizations in India. We present a stylized Hotelling-style model in which two religious 
organizations position themselves at opposite locations to differentiate themselves on the 
religious spectrum in order to compete to attract adherents. Moreover, the model predicts that 
economic inequality can make both organizations increase their provision of non-religious 
services to retain adherents. In order to test our propositions, we present unique primary 
survey data on the economics of religion that we have collected from 2006-2008 on 568 
Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Jain religious organizations spread across seven Indian 
states.  We use these data to provide qualitative and descriptive statistics from the survey that 
is consistent and provides initial support for our propositions. We show that these 
organizations have substantially increased their provision of religious and non-religious 
services, but that there are significant variations by religion. We also provide quantitative 
evidence based on econometric testing to highlight that Indian religious organizations are 
maximizing the differences in their ideology with respect to other organizations, and are also 
providing higher education and health services as economic inequality increases in India. 
 
JEL Classification Code: Z12 
Keywords: Economics of Religion, Service Provision, Hotelling Model, Inequality, India
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1. Introduction 
‘Political economy or economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it 
examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing. 
Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side, a part 
of the study of man. For man's character has been moulded by his every-day work, and the 
material resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence unless it be 
that of his religious ideals; and the two great forming agencies of the world's history have 
been the religious and the economic. Here and there the ardour of the military or the artistic 
spirit has been for a while predominant: but religious and economic influences have nowhere 
been displaced from the front rank even for a time; and they have nearly always been more 
important than all others put together.’ 
- Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890), Book 1, Chapter 1, Page 1. 
So commences what is arguably one of the greatest books ever written on economic science. 
And it begins not only with a discussion of the importance of economics with which it is 
primarily concerned, but highlights in equal measure the fundamental role of religion in 
moulding both an individual’s motivations and the course of world history. Alfred Marshall’s 
prophecy could not have been more prescient as economics today has much to offer the study 
of contemporary religion.  
In the 21st century, the increasing importance of religion in both developed and developing 
countries has been observed by scholars investigating the economics of religion (Iannaccone 
1998; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso et al. 2003; Berman 2009). Questions such as why 
some religions appear to become more flexible or accommodating as they evolve over time, 
while others develop more fundamentalist groups within them, continues to fascinate scholars 
who have commented on the resilience of religion (Stark and Finke, 2001). This is linked to 
the manner in which religion constitutes an important source of ‘spiritual capital’, 
contributing significantly to the building of norms and networks among populations, 
organized on the basis of religion.  
It is against this backdrop that in this paper we propose that the resilience of religion draws 
from the ability of religions to undertake innovation and innovative behaviour, similar to the 
behaviour commonly observed among firms. To date, there are several existing theories that 
make claim to account for the resilience of religion such as family socialization, the 
importance of social networks, and a belief in otherworldly or supernatural elements 
(Christiano et al, 2008). But it may also be relevant to view the persistence of religion in 
societies not merely as the outcome of these largely sociological processes, but equally as a 
rational economic response to changes in the political, ecological, and economic 
environments in which they operate. It is in this context that we ask a simple question: How 
do religious organizations provide and innovate their religious and non-religious services in 
response to inequality and the competition for adherents? 
Recent research within economics has been examining identity more closely using 
information from developing countries like India (for example, see recent work by Amartya 
Sen (2005)). There is also a broader literature on religious competition and why economic 
growth has not led to a decline in the practice of religion in rich countries (McBride 2010). In 
the context of India, a country which is characterized by the multiplicity of religions which 
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have proven extraordinarily resilient, the active practice of religion, and religious conflict, 
this has been commented upon extensively by historians, political scientists, sociologists and 
others (Bayly 1983; Engineer 1984; Bagchi 1991; Varshney 2000; Brass 2003). Other studies 
explore the effect of economic growth on religious conflict in India (Bohlken and Sergenti, 
2010). There are also more recent studies of religion which suggest for example that there are 
over 30,000 Muslim, and other religious schools in India (US Department of State 2010). Our 
study adds to existing analyses of religion by contributing theoretically and empirically to 
this growing literature. 
We suggest that the existing economics of religion literature has examined competition, 
innovation or service provision independently. The existing theories whether from economics 
or other disciplines do not address how the decision to choose a religious ideology or offer a 
religious service might be related jointly to economic concerns such as inequality and non-
religious service provision. We bring these two sets of concerns together: our economic 
theory takes the existing religion research forward by offering a model of religion and service 
provision by religious organizations that also shows how religious ideologies might differ in 
response to competition. In particular, how religious organizations provide and innovate their 
religious and non-religious services consistent with changes in income inequality and the 
competition for adherents. We present a simple and stylized Hotelling-style model in which 
two religious organizations choose a religious focal point and decide upon the non-religious 
services provided. We show in the model that the organizations will position themselves at 
opposite locations to differentiate themselves on the religious spectrum, but that in 
equilibrium, economic inequality is sufficient to make both organizations increase their 
provision of non-religious services. To that end, our study is valuable because it provides an 
economic theory for differentiation of religious offerings in the context of religious and non-
religious service provision.  
Then, in order to test the model’s two key propositions, we present a unique dataset – to the 
best of our knowledge, the first economic survey of religious institutions undertaken in India, 
which we conducted between 2006 and 2008. These rich and unique primary data are based 
on 568 religious organizations which we collected in a survey that spanned 7 large Indian 
states, and was a major and complex task of planning and execution. These data include 
information on Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, and Jain organizations, and are collected to 
examine the economic and competitive behaviour of these organizations. The states we 
examined are Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
West Bengal and Maharashtra. Consequently, these data cover basic demographics, religious 
service provision, non-religious service provision such as education and health, innovations 
to religion, adherents, donations, expenditures, and other issues. 
We use these data to provide support for our theoretical propositions in two ways: first, we 
provide qualitative and descriptive statistics from the survey that is consistent and provides 
initial support for our two propositions. Second, we support this with quantitative evidence 
based on econometric testing to illustrate the empirical regularity of the phenomena under 
study. In doing so, we find that in terms of religious services, of all the religious services 
provided by the organizations, propagation of the faith and religious education are considered 
the two most important activities provided by them. Muslim and Christian organizations 
provide more by way of religious education which they rate as their main activity compared 
to the Hindus. We highlight that religious organizations in India are choosing to maximize 
the differences in their ideology with respect to other organizations. We find evidence that 
religious organizations of all religions in India have substantially increased their provision of 
non-religious services possibly in order to substitute for the lack of state provision, and that 
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this is related to their perception of economic inequality and competition. Using a range of 
econometric methods, we also show that the average change in the probability of providing 
higher levels of education and health services for an increase in the perception of inequality 
remains positive and significant.   
In keeping with the predictions of our theory, and as a consequence, it may be that some 
religious organizations in India have become more radical, others more liberal. But regardless 
of this position, the existence of economic inequality between groups makes both radical and 
more liberal organizations provide more education and health services, accounting perhaps 
for the paradoxical co-existence of a more prosperous economy and more service provision 
by religious organizations.  
We emphasize also that counter to some historical, sociological or anthropological analyses 
of religion in India that have mainly studied the many negative consequences that religion 
might engender such as the phenomenon of ‘communalism’, we emphasize particularly in 
this study, the positive role of some religious organizations in India today. Collectively from 
our findings therefore, we argue that innovations to religion, along religious and non-
religious lines, may account for the resilience of religious organizations in India today. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the literature on 
innovations to religion in the context of the economics of religion. Section 3 presents the 
model. Section 4 discusses our primary survey of religious organizations undertaken in India. 
In this context, Section 5 discusses the qualitative evidence and descriptive statistics in terms 
of the provision of religious and non-religious services, and innovations to this provision. 
This section also includes a discussion of religious organizations’ perception of economic 
inequality and religious competition. In doing so we provide qualitative and descriptive 
statistics from the survey that is consistent and provides initial support for the propositions. 
Section 6 presents the quantitative econometric findings of the research that tests the 
theoretical propositions developed and the key results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. How do Religions Innovate? 
 
We begin by defining an `innovation' to religion: All religions have a core set of beliefs as set 
out in their scriptural theology, for example in books such as the Bible, the Koran or the 
Bhagvad Gita. But actual religious practice and religious observance involve the 
interpretation of these beliefs either by the religious clergy or by individuals. For example, 
with respect to religions such as Islam in India, the interpretation of the words of the Prophet 
Mohammad (the `Sunnah'), undertaken by the 'ulema' or Muslim religious clergy in India, is 
equally important to the practice of the Islamic religion as are the sayings of the Koran. Since 
the process of interpretation of the Islamic religion is conducted mainly by the 'ulema', this 
may be critical to the evolution of religious practice within Islam in India. For example, in the 
specific context of India, the main debates about the Islamic religion in the 1990s and more 
recently have centred almost exclusively on the clergy's interpretation of the Muslim 
woman's right to divorce, her entitlement to alimony, the age at which a Muslim woman 
marries, and the practice of `triple divorce'. To the extent that scriptural theology that outlines 
a religion's core beliefs is subject to such interpretation, we argue that there exists the 
potential for innovation.  
 
So we can define `innovation' in the religion sector to be any alteration to beliefs and/or to 
religious practice either by individuals or by the religious clergy that has an impact on the 
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subsequent actual observance of the religion. Consequently, taking a cue from the literature 
from the economics of innovation, we can think of `innovation' in the religion sector if there 
are alterations to religious practice, which makes previous practice less likely to be adopted. 
For example, in the historical context of India, we can think of Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism 
and the Bhakti movement, which all started out essentially as religious reform movements of 
Hinduism, as `innovations' to Hinduism mainly because they attempted to remove from 
Hinduism the dogmatic finality of caste and the emphasis on religious rituals, characteristic 
of Hinduism at the time. Some of these innovations to Hinduism, such as Buddhism and 
Jainism, went so far as to lead to the formation of new religions. More recently, other social 
concerns (legal restrictions on child marriage, absence of polygyny), also generate 
contradictions in the religion which the religious clergy need to deal with. But we argue that 
it is precisely this kind of `innovation' which sustains the practice and observance of religion 
not only in India, but also in many other parts of the world. For example, in Pakistan, the 
ulema have dealt with Islamic scriptural theological prescriptions on polygyny by insisting 
upon the construction of an arbitration council to negotiate divorce (Iyer 2002). 
Consequently, this theory would go so far as to argue that religions that do not innovate at all 
`fall off the cliff' as it were, witnessing evidence of declining religious adherence. 
 
We argue that while altering the interpretation of religion is one channel through which 
'innovation' might take place, changing the service-levels provided by organizations, 
particularly with respect to education and health, may be another channel, in a situation 
where these services are less well-provided for by the state. So we can think of 'innovation' as 
occurring along two distinct dimensions - the religious, and the socio-economic, with changes 
to both of these influencing the number of adherents over time. 
 
2.1. The Economics of Religion 
Our study contributes to the existing work on the rational choice approach to understanding 
religion, but also contributes to understanding how religious competition matters in 
developing countries. Our interest in innovations to religion can be linked to economists' 
existing interests in religion and social economics more generally (Becker and Murphy 2000; 
Putnam 2000). The economics of religion is driven by the continuing persistence and impact 
of religion in developed and developing countries alike (Iannaccone 2005; Bisin and Verdier 
2000; Iyer 2008).  
Studies in the economics of religion can be categorized into three main groups: first, those 
that have focused on the links between religion and economic theory; second, those that have 
focused on policy such as debates about faith-based welfare programmes, and the economic 
regulation of the church; and thirdly, those that have examined empirically the influence of 
religion on economic behaviour, both at the macro and micro levels.  
Adam Smith first made reference to the church in The Wealth of Nations, and Max Weber 
discussed the influence of the Protestant ethic on capitalism (Weber 1904). Max Weber's 
thesis was about the Protestant ethic and modern capitalist development, which was echoed 
by Landes (1998), and suggests that secular ideas occasioned by capitalist development may 
have led to less religious attendance, for example in North-West Europe today. However, 
there have also been critiques of this thesis (Tawny 1926; Gorsky 2005). Lal (1998) 
highlights the interaction between factor endowments, culture, and politics as a determinant 
of modern economic growth. 
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The broadly socio-economic view of religion, which expounds the rational choice approach 
to the study of religion, is found in the work of many economists and others (Azzi and 
Ehrenberg 1975; Iannaccone 1998; Montgomery 1996; Stark, Iannaccone and Finke 1996; 
Stark and Finke 2000; Lechner 2006). The focus here has been both on the supply side, in 
terms of the structures of religious organizations (Dehejia et al 2007), and on the demand 
side, in terms of the preferences of consumers of religion (Oslington 2003). This implies that 
the activities of religious economies are important: for example, Stark and Finke state that 
`Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market of 
current and potential customers, a set of organizations or firms seeking to serve that market, 
and the religion offered by various organizations.' (Stark and Finke, 2000, p. 2-3).  
In this approach, individuals are rational consumers of religion who decide whether or not to 
believe, or in which religion to believe, based on a cost-benefit analysis and relative to their 
initial endowments. In this view, people adopt religion because it is optimal for them to do so 
and their beliefs and activities may change over time. In a similar way, the supply of religion 
is explained by churches behaving similarly to firms in a competitive market, and especially 
providing services to attract potential customers. This idea underlies much of the work in this 
paper as well. In this context, we think of this issue as if buyers (or individuals) and sellers 
(or the religions) meet in a marketplace in which supply and demand dictate allocations of 
adherents across religions. Therefore, the twin ideas that an individual selects religion as a 
rational choice and that the functioning of religion in society emulates that of an economy, 
forms the foundations of the ‘new paradigm’ of the sociology of religion today (Lechner 
2006). 
The backdrop for this renewed interest in religion is also whether deregulation or lack of 
regulation of religious organizations is imperative. There has been a renewed interest in 
revisiting the Weber hypothesis empirically as well. Recent studies examine whether 
religious beliefs and participation explains economic development and whether in turn it may 
be explained by the structure of religious groups and organizations, specifically whether or 
not state religions matter in terms of the implications of a monopolistic structure for the 
freedom of markets (Barro and McCleary 2003; Stark and Finke 2000; Barro and McCleary 
2005; North and Gwin 2004; Gruber and Hungerman 2006), although some research has also 
highlighted the difficulty of identifying the effect of religion clearly in econometric studies of 
its impact in cross-country studies (for example, Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan, 2011). Other 
macro-based studies have examined specific hypotheses, based on certain religions. For 
example, La Porta et al. (1999) show that in countries with a high proportion of Catholics or 
Muslims, the performance of government is reduced and hence, these nations are more likely 
to be poor. Research on the impact of religion on people's economic attitudes reveals that 
Christian religions are more positively associated with attitudes conducive to economic 
growth in comparison to Islamic belief (Guiso et al 2003). There is also a recent literature 
that has been evaluating the historical basis of conflict and the role of religion and empire in 
these contexts (Iyigun 2008). 
Current research in the economics of religion has been evaluating whether religion and 
politics are mutually exclusive (Caplow 1985). Iannaccone and Makowsky (2007) explore the 
relationship between regional issues and religion. In exploring the interaction between 
religion and politics on an international scale, Haynes (2001) notes that although religious 
organizations, like the Islamic radicals and the Catholic Church, have acted prominently in 
some national contexts to undermine the authority of the government, generally they should 
not be considered a threat to state sovereignty. The notion of 'strategic extremism', posited by 
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005), shows that politicians have an incentive to take an 
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extreme stand on issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage in order to induce their core 
supporters to vote and make donations. Furthermore, religious or political institutions may 
also choose extreme positions in order to mitigate the effects of free rider problems 
(Appelbaum and Katz  2007). In related literature, economic perspectives on terrorism both 
within and across national boundaries have also been explored (Berman and Laitin 2004; 
Sandler and Enders 2004; de Mesquita 2005; Krueger 2007; Keefer and Loayza 2008; 
Berman 2009). Other studies have attempted to understand the broader structures of religion 
and religious movements (Warner 1993; Gruber 2005; Glaeser 2005), or religion in particular 
parts of the world (Kuran 2004). 
One of the themes of this literature is that many religious groups such as, for example the 
Hamas, have provided spiritual services alongside social and welfare services in the regions 
they operate (Berman 2009). As Berman points out in this context, this approach emphasizes 
the social and economic aspects of religious communities, rather than purely the effect of 
religious faith. As he writes, ‘Distinguishing between those two functions is often difficult, 
but the distinction is critical. Regardless of the strength of a member’s faith, and regardless of 
the salience of a theology, an organization that can limit shirking will be more successful at 
mutual aid….That’s why social service provision and spiritual service provision so often 
appear together in communities, making it difficult to distinguish commitment to beliefs from 
commitment to community, for community members and outside observers alike.’ (Berman 
2009, p. 19). 
Thus, the literature on the economics of religion encompasses both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic studies. However the existing economics literature has examined 
competition, innovation or service provision independently. One of the main points which 
other academic disciplines have tried to address is why we see in practice a range of religious 
organizations becoming more liberal (or less conservative in their requirements for religious 
practice and observance) or radical (more stringent on the same dimensions with 
consequences more widely) over time, such as for example communalism in India. The 
existing theories whether from economics or other disciplines do not address how the 
decision to choose a religious ideology or offer a religious service might be related to 
economic concerns such as inequality and non-religious service provision. We bring these 
two sets of concerns together: our economic theory takes the existing religion research 
forward by offering a model of religion and service provision by religious organizations that 
also shows how religious ideologies might differ in response to competition. Specifically, 
how religious organizations provide and innovate their religious and non-religious services 
consistent with changes in income inequality and the competition for adherents amongst 
them. We also take our theory to data, testing it on primary data that we have collected in 
India. To that end, our study is valuable because it provides an economic theory for 
differentiation of religious offerings in the context of religious and non-religious service 
provision.  
3. The Model 
To develop a model which embodies our ideas, we focus on the economics of innovation, the 
links between innovation and competition, and service provision. The intuition behind our 
model is as follows: Suppose we begin with a simplified economy in which there are 2 
religious organizations6. We assume that each organization is competing for adherents and 
                                                            
6 Our model is applicable to a situation where there are two organizations from different religions, such as for 
example if we were thinking about competition between Hindus and Muslims, or to a situation in which there 
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that each organization tries to maximize adherents via choosing a focal point. Each 
organization maximizes adherents possibly because of political, monetary or other benefits 
that they derive from having a large number of adherents. Each organization is also providing 
some non-religious services which we assume the poor will value and use more than the rich, 
because the latter will already have them.  
Our model also identifies the criteria that each adherent uses to choose membership of a 
religious organization. The adherent chooses which organization to join based on two factors 
- first, the difference between their personal focal point relative to the religious organization’s 
focal point. Secondly, the wealth benefits from membership of a religious organization (we 
can think of this say as education, health, employment, or other services that arise from 
membership of the organization). Again we think the poor will value these services more than 
the rich.  
In classic economic terms, this creates a game theoretic problem in which the two religious 
organizations have to choose a religious focal point and decide upon the non-religious 
services provided. But they need to do this by taking into account each others’ choices, while 
they are both competing for adherents in this simplified model. We also look at what happens 
to the problem when there is economic inequality across the population of individuals in the 
economy.  
Let us now develop our model more formally. Our model of innovation by religious 
organizations is similar to Hotelling's model of price and location competition (Hotelling 
1929). Let ܫ denote a set of individuals. For individual ݅ ∈ 	ܫ, let e୧ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ denote 
individual's ݅'s economic well-being, and x୧ ∈ ሾ0, 1ሿ denote individual ݅'s religiousness. 
Assume that x୧ is uniformly distributed across all individuals over ሾ0,1ሿ, and that e୧ ൌ e, for 
all ݅. Two religious organizations compete for individuals in ܫ by choosing a religious focal 
point ݔ	 ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ, and an amount of non-religious services ݏ	 ∈ 	 ሾ0,∞ሻ. The two organizations 
have identical payoff functions, which are ൫p-s൯n, where ݌	 ൐ 	0 is a given constant, and ݊ is 
the number of adherents to the organization. Individual ݅’s expected utility function is 
assumed to have the following form, 
 ݑ௜ ൌ െሺݔ௜ െ ݔሻଶ ൅
ݏ
݁௜ (1) 
 
where ݔ and ݏ are chosen by the organization which individual ݅ chooses to be affiliated with. 
The timing of the game is as follows. The two organizations choose ݔ simultaneously, then 
they observe each other's choices of ݔ, and choose ݏ simultaneously. Individuals go to the 
organization that gives them a higher utility. It may be helpful to clarify here that we model 
the organizations as choosing their focal points first, and then their service provision levels. 
The reason for our doing so is because we think that the religious focal point decision is 
likely to be more ‘sticky’ than the service provision decision. After all, choosing the religious 
focal point may encompass complex issues that concern religious theology, its interpretation, 
and religious practice. Religious organizations need to be clear where they stand religiously 
before they can determine their service levels. Therefore technically, the timing of the game 
in our model is conceptualized as similar to a standard location-price competition model from 
the economics of industrial organization in which firms decide where to locate first and then 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
are two competing organizations that belong to the same religion, which may be more typically the case in 
India. 
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decide what prices to charge. In keeping with this justification, our organizations first need to 
decide where they stand religiously by choosing a religious focal point before they can decide 
how much non-religious services to provide. 
3.1. Characterization of Equilibrium 
    We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Let ݔ₁ and ݔ₂ denote 
the religious focal points chosen by the organizations. Fix any ݔ₁ and ݔ₂, such that 0	 ൑
	ݔ₁	 ൏ 	ݔ₂	൑ 	1, we first calculate the Nash equilibrium in the subgame following ሺݔ₁, ݔ₂ሻ. Let 
ݏ₁ and ݏ₂ denote the non-religious services chosen by the organizations. For fixed ݏ₁, ݏ₂, the 
individual who is indifferent between the two organizations should satisfy 
 െሺݔ െ ݔଵሻଶ ൅
ݏଵ
݁ ൌ െሺݔ െ ݔଶሻ
ଶ ൅ ݏଶ݁  (2) 
 
where ݔ is the indifferent individual's religiousness. Any individual with a lower 
religiousness chooses organization 1, and any individual with a higher religiousness chooses 
organization 2. Given the uniform distribution of the individuals' religiousness, solving for 
the ݔ in (2), the number of adherents of organization 1 is therefore 
 ݔ ൌ ൬ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ2 ൰ ൅ ቀ
ݏଵ െ ݏଶ
݁ ቁ
1
2ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ  (3) 
 
And the number of adherents of organization 2 is 1 െ ݔ. 
 
Organization 1's problem is thus 
 max௦భ ሺ݌ െ ݏଵሻݔ  
 
The first order condition of this problem is 
 ݏଵ ൌ
݌ ൅ ݏଶ
2 െ
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ
2 ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ݁  (4) 
 
Similarly, organization 2’s problem is    
max௦మ ሺ݌ െ ݏଶሻሺ1 െ ݔሻ 
  
 
And the first order condition for organization 2 is 
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 ݏଶ ൌ
݌ ൅ ݏଵ
2 െ
2 െ ݔଵ െ ݔଶ
2 ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ݁ (5) 
 
Solving for ݏ₁ and ݏ₂, we have 
 ݏଵ ൌ ݌ െ
1
3 ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻሺ2 ൅ ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶሻ݁ 
(6) 
 ݏଶ ൌ ݌ െ
1
3 ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻሺ4 െ ݔଵ െ ݔଶሻ݁ 
 
Now we calculate the equilibrium choices of ݔ₁ and ݔ₂.  For fixed ݔ₁ and ݔ₂, organization 1's 
payoff is 
 ߨଵሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ ∶ൌ ሺ݌ െ ݏଵሻݔ (7) 
 
where ݔ is given in (3), and ݏ₁ is given in (6). To emphasize the dependence of ݔ on ݔ₁, ݔ₂,
ݏ₁, and ݏ₂, and the dependence of ݏ₁ and ݏ₂ on ݔ₁ and ݔ₂, we rewrite (7) as 
 ߨଵሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ ൌ ൫݌ െ ݏଵሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ൯ݔ൫ݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݏଵሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ, ݏଶሺݔଵ, ݔଶሻ൯  
  
By the envelope theorem, as we differentiate ߎ¹ with respect to ݔ₁, we can take ݏ₁ሺݔ₁, ݔ₂ሻ as 
a constant, because the partial derivative of ߎ¹ with respect to ݏ₁ is equal to 0 at the optimal 
ݏ₁ሺݔ₁, ݔ₂ሻ. Moreover, in equilibrium it must be that ݌	 ൒ 	ݏ₁	ሺݔ₁, ݔ₂ሻ. Therefore, to calculate 
the impact of ݔ₁ on ߎ¹, it suffices to calculate ௗ௫ௗ௫భ ൅
ௗ௫
ௗ௦మ
ௗ௦మ
ௗ௫భ. From (3), 
 
 
݀ݔ
݀ݔଵ ൌ
1
2 ൅
ݏଵ െ ݏଶ
݁
1
2ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻଶ   
 
From (3) and (6), 
 
݀ݔ
݀ݏଶ
݀ݏଶ
݀ݔଵ ൌ
1
3
ሺݔଵ െ 2ሻ
ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ  
 
From (6) 
 ݏଵ െ	ݏଶ ൌ
1
3 ݁ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻሺ2 െ 2ݔଵ െ 2ݔଶሻ  
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Hence 
 
݀ݔ
݀ݔଵ ൌ
1
2 ൅
1
3
ሺ1 െ ݔଵ െ ݔଶሻ
ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ   
 
Calculation shows that ௗ௫ௗ௫భ ൅
ௗ௫
ௗ௦మ
ௗ௦మ
ௗ௫భ ൏ 0,  for all ݔ₁, ݔ₂, therefore, organization 1 chooses ݔ₁ ൌ 0 in equilibrium. Similarly, organization 2 chooses ݔ₂ ൌ 1 in equilibrium. The two 
organizations maximize the differentiation of their religious focal points, to avoid 
competition in the non-religious services. 
So far in the analysis we assumed that ݔ₁ ൏ ݔ₂. We now argue that it is impossible to have an 
equilibrium in which ݔ₁ ൌ ݔ₂. Suppose that there is. Then in the subgame conditional on 
ݔ₁ ൌ ݔ₂ being chosen, the two organizations will compete away any positive profits by 
raising ݏ all the way to ݌, otherwise one organization can always offer a bit more services 
than the other and grab the whole market and obtain a higher payoff. Hence, both 
organizations receive zero profits in the subgame. But then organization 1 can deviate by 
choosing a lower ݔ₁  and make a positive profit, because our analysis above shows that both 
organizations make positive profits in any subgame following ݔ₁ ൏ ݔ₂ being chosen. 
All else being equal, now we introduce economic inequality. Let eୌ ൌ ܽ݁ and ݁௅ ൌ ܾ݁	where 
ܽ  and ܾ are positive constants. Suppose the economic well-being of half of the population 
goes up to eୌ, and the economic well-being of the other half goes down to ݁௅. Moreover, we 
assume that there is no correlation at the individual level between economic well-being and 
religiousness. Without loss of generality, we can assume that for each ݔ	 ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ, there is a 
rich individual with eୌ with probability ½ and a poor individual with e୐ with probability ½ , 
both have the same religiousness ݔ. We follow the same steps as above to characterize the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with inequality. Fix ݔ₁ and ݔ₂, let xୌ denote the 
number of rich adherents of organization 1, and x୐ denote the number of poor adherents of 
organization 1. The same indifference condition (2) applies to Hx  and Lx  separately, 
 
െሺݔு െ ݔଵሻଶ ൅
ݏଵ
eୌ ൌ െሺݔு െ ݔଶሻ
ଶ ൅ ݏଶeୌ 
 
െሺݔ௅ െ ݔଵሻଶ ൅
ݏଵ
e୐ ൌ െሺݔ௅ െ ݔଶሻ
ଶ ൅ ݏଶe୐ 
Hence 
 
ݔு ൌ
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ
2 ൅
ݏଵ െ ݏଶ
݁ு
1
2ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ 
 
ݔ௅ ൌ
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ
2 ൅
ݏଵ െ ݏଶ
݁௅
1
2ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ 
 
Hence the total number of adherents of organization 1 is 
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 ݔு ൅ ݔ௅
2 	 ൌ
ݔଵ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ݏଵ െ ݏଶ2ሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ ቀ
݁ு ൅ ݁௅݁ு݁௅ ቁ
2  
(8) 
 
Organization 1's problem is 
 max௦భ ሺ݌ െ ݏଵሻ ൬
ݔு ൅ ݔ௅
2 ൰  
 
The first order condition of the problem is 
 ݏଵ ൌ
݌ ൅ ݏଶ
2 െ ሺݔଵ ൅ ݔଶሻሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ
݁ு݁௅
݁ு ൅ ݁௅ (9) 
 
Organization 2’s objective function is  
max௦మ ሺ݌ െ ݏଶሻ ൬1 െ ൬
ݔு ൅ ݔ௅
2 	൰	൰ 
 
The first order condition for organization 2's problem is 
 ݏଶ ൌ
݌ ൅ ݏଵ
2 െ ሺ2 െ ݔଵ െ ݔଶሻሺݔଶ െ ݔଵሻ
݁ு݁௅
݁ு ൅ ݁௅ (10) 
 
Comparing (9) and (10) with (4) and (5), it is easy to see that the non-religious services 
provided by the two organizations go up in the inequality case, as shown in Figure 4, if 
 
݁ு݁௅
݁ு ൅ ݁௅ ൏
݁
2  
Or equivalently,  
ܾ ൏ ܽ2ܽ െ 1 
 
 
Therefore, both religious organizations will provide more non-religious services if the poor 
remain poor enough when there is economic inequality. 
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Figure 1. Effects of remaining poverty on the provision of non-religious services 
1s
2s
4eq
5eq
10eq
9eq
 
Finally we calculate the equilibrium choices of x₁ and x₂, in the inequality case. Notice that if 
we replace ୣౄୣైୣ౞ା	ୣై	 by 
௘
ଶ  in (8), (9), and (10), we get exactly (3), (4), and (5). Notice also that 
in the envelop theorem argument above, the partial derivatives are independent of ݁. 
Therefore, the same result carries on to the inequality case, i.e., ݔ₁	 ൌ 	0, ݔ₂	 ൌ 	1. 
 We summarize the analysis into the following two propositions: 
Proposition 1. The two religious organizations maximize the differentiation in their religious 
focal points regardless of economic inequality in order to minimize competition in the 
provision of non-religious services. 
Proposition 2. When there is some economic inequality, if the poor remain poor enough, then 
both religious organizations will also provide more non-religious services. 
Hence, we show that when we solve the model mathematically, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium for these religious organizations is such that it generates these two propositions 
that describe their behavior. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is because the organizations 
are differentiating themselves religiously in order to minimize the amount they have to 
compete for providing non-religious services. And the intuition behind Proposition 2 is that 
when economic inequality is rising, then religious organizations provide more non-religious 
services because if the poor remain poor enough, and if there is a sizeable proportion of them, 
then under the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of non-religious services in an 
individual’s economic well-being, both religious organizations will find it in their interests to 
provide more non-religious services to attract the poor, as the organizations are competing for 
more adherents among them. Our model suggests that one factor which pushes religious 
organizations towards more extremes is non-religious service provision: religious 
organizations essentially product differentiate in order to minimize competition in service 
provision. In the next section we discuss the survey of the religious organizations in India. 
4. The Survey of Religious Organizations in India 
As a part of this study, we planned and executed, to the best of our knowledge, the first  
Indian survey of 568 religious organizations with a view to understanding their economic, 
innovative, and competitive behaviour. The survey conducted between 2006-2008 involved 
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extensive primary data collection and careful fieldwork using questionnaires and personal 
interviews. The survey involved interviews with 272 Hindu (47.89%), 248 Muslim (43.66%), 
25 Christian (4.40%), 23 Sikh and Jain organizations (4.05%) based in the Indian states of 
Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra 
and Karnataka, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. This research involved 52 people from India 
helping conduct the survey.  
A random sample of religious organizations in selected districts of each of the seven states 
was conducted, based on a listing of all religious organizations listed by the Registrar of 
Charities. We have random samples within states but equal samples across them. The sample 
is diverse and shows that the organizations have been in existence for varying lengths of 
time7.  
Table 1. Distribution of the sample across religions 
 Number            Percentage 
Hindu 272 47.89 
Muslim 248 43.66 
Christian 25 4.40 
Other 23 4.05   
Total  568 100.00 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the sample by region and religion 
 Hindu  Muslim  Christian  Other  All-India  Percentage  
Gujarat  51 34 3 0 88 15.49 
Jammu and 
Kashmir  
26 41 4 11 82 14.44 
Karnataka  27 42 6 0 75 13.20 
Maharashtra  64 11 1 2 78 13.73 
Madhya 
Pradesh  
40 30 2 3 75 13.20 
Uttar Pradesh  36 52 3 1 92 16.20 
West Bengal  28 38 6 6 78 13.73   
Total  272 248 25 23 568 100.00 
 
The survey included questions on basic demographics; areas of operation; adherent numbers; 
religious practices and religious service provision; non-religious service provision; 
perceptions of how all types of service provision have changed over time; sources of income 
and expenditure including donations and other assets; and perceptions of competitive 
intensity with other religious organizations. 
We emphasize that this survey was an elaborate task of planning, coordination and execution, 
and that the questions asked were very sensitive as were the nature of the respondents. The 
main states in which the survey was conducted is shown in Figure 2.  Table 3 illustrates the 
manpower used in this survey and the main districts of India covered by the research. Jammu 
                                                            
7 For example, in terms of their date of foundation although a majority of the organizations were founded in the 
19th and 20th centuries, some organizations were founded as early as the 13th century, and others were founded 
nine centuries later in the 21st century. 
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Table 3 also shows the average number of visits per interview. This varies between 1.6 visits 
to 3.5 visits per religious organization. In order to avoid common-method bias, there were on 
average 3 people interviewed in each organization – typically a trustee, one person 
responsible for administration and the other who could talk about financial issues. For 
philosophical issues about the religion we talked to the temple or mosque trustees, for 
managerial and employment issues we talked to the general administration of the temple who 
was usually an employee. For financial issues, we spoke to the treasurer or employees of the 
accounts section of the religious institution. In case there were any inconsistencies we went 
back to the relevant official to seek clarification.  
We also first conducted a pilot survey in two states in order to test run the questionnaire 
before administering the actual survey in all seven states. Also, we provided training to the 
field staff and conducted practice sessions with them to ensure reliability and consistency in 
recording responses to questions among the field staff. The questionnaire survey that was 
administered to the organizations consisted of a series of questions that were grouped into 
five mains sections: demographics which covered basic information about the organizations, 
background changes that included perceptions about changes in inequality, innovation in 
religious and non-religious service provision, knowledge of other organizations, and 
questions on donations received and expenditure incurred.  
There were several issues that arose in the sample design and in administering this survey. 
First, response rates were reduced if a Hindu investigator approached a Muslim organization 
and vice-versa. We did, for example experience some issues with data collection in Jammu 
and Kashmir where it was extremely difficult to conduct interviews. In Jammu and Kashmir 
some of the field staff had to make 4 or 5 visits to get the information needed since in 
keeping with our sample design, we had to interview several individuals to gather the 
necessary information. This also allowed us to understand better all the services and activities 
provided by the organization. Secondly, we only used Hindu and Muslim investigators as the 
Christian organizations were not opposed to responding to a non-Christian investigator.  
 
In the sample, most of the organizations operated in a combination of rural and urban areas: 
there were 42 organizations (7.39%) which operated in rural areas only; 377 (66.37%) which 
operated in an urban area; and 149 organizations (26.23%) who operated in both rural and 
urban areas. In the survey we asked direct questions on adherent numbers, as shown in Table 
4 which denotes the organizations' reported adherent numbers in 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2007. 
The figures provided below were cross-checked against adherent statistics held by the 
organizations. 
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Table 4. Number of adherents between 1985-2007 
Adherents 1985  1995  2005  2007  
 Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  Freq.  %  
Less than 
1000  
51 8.98 28 4.93 24 4.23 41 7.22 
1000-4999  89 15.67 90 15.85 62 10.92 80 14.08 
5000-9999  52 9.15 56 9.86 67 11.80 102 17.96 
10000-19999  44 7.75 49 8.63 50 8.80 49 8.63 
20000-49999  49 8.63 49 8.63 57 10.04 56 9.86 
50000-99999  46 8.10 59 10.39 59 10.39 49 8.63 
100,000 to 
300,000   
35 6.16 80 14.08 73 12.85 96 16.90 
300,000 to 
500,000   
2 0.35 2 0.35 30 5.28 29 5.11 
Greater than 
500,000  
5 0.88 5 0.88 17 2.99 48 8.45 
Do not know  195 34.33 150 26.41 129 22.71 18 3.17   
Total  568 100.00 568 100.00 568 100.00 568 100.00 
 
Table 4 shows religious organizations’ reported adherent numbers from 1985-2007. What we 
see from this table is that reported adherent group size has been increasing overall, although 
the split between the different bands has remained more or less stable. What is particularly 
striking is the number of organizations reporting greater than 500,000 adherents, which has 
increased from approximately 5 organizations (0.88%) in 1985 to 48 organizations (8.45%) in 
2007. The adherent numbers are important because donations from them might be important 
for the organizations. Annual donations received ranged from Rs. 25,000 to greater than Rs. 
10 million. In terms of the location of donors, approximately 61% were primarily from the 
same state or region, about 19.54% were from across the state, and 10.04% were from other 
Indian states. Only 2.82% of organizations reported that they received international 
donations. 
 
5. Qualitative Evidence on Religious and Non-Religious Services 
 
In this section we provide qualitative evidence to support the propositions of our model. 
These qualitative perceptions are based on detailed field notes and discussions undertaken 
collectively by members of the project team, and on descriptive statistics generated by the 
organizations’ responses to questions in the questionnaire. The sections lend qualitative 
support for Propositions 1 and 2 from our model. The key findings which emerge is that most 
religious organizations did make enormous efforts to reach out to people of their own religion 
by providing both religious and non-religious services. 
 
5.1. Religious Beliefs and Religious Services 
The organizations were asked how they would describe themselves religiously and Table 5 
illustrates the strength of religious beliefs by nature of the religious organization, grouped by 
their religious affiliation.   
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We then asked the organizations to identify what motivated them the most and their 
responses are grouped in Table 6. Spirituality and service were the avowed main motivations 
for the organizations. 
 
We then asked the organizations to identify what motivated them the most and their 
responses are grouped in Table 6. Spirituality and service were the avowed main motivations 
for the organizations. 
 
Table 6. Motivation for the religious organization 
Motive Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Not ranked 
             
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
             
Spirituality 194 34.2 131 23.1 78 13.7 116 20.4 1 0.2 48 8.5 
             
Service 179 31.5 163 28.7 98 17.3 78 13.7 2 0.4 48 8.5 
             
Protecting from 
impure influences 35 6.2 120 21.1 207 36.4 134 23.6 3 0.5 69 12.2
             
Showing the right 
path 128 22.5 108 19 125 22 120 21.1 2 0.4 85 15 
             
Other 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.2 6 1.1 39 6.9 520 91.6
 
 
In terms of motives for their activities, religious and otherwise, a majority of organizations 
said that providing social service was the raison d’être of their work, followed closely by 
considerations such as spirituality, showing the right path and protection from impure 
influences. Some organizations were skeptical of the potential of innovation to change Indian 
society for the better: For example, at one Hindu religious organization, the priest 
emphasized that ideally it was important that the following three virtues were upheld for a 
prosperous society - 'Raja garam; baniya naram aur ladki sharam', which translates as 'The 
king should be bold and strong; the traders should be sincere and polite; and the girls should 
be full of modesty and shyness.' But, he laments 'Now this is Kalyug (the modern age). 
Everything has gone upside down!' 
 
The survey asked a series of questions about religious service provision. For example, we 
asked 'What are the religious services provided by your organization?' And the main 
responses were propagation of the faith; weddings, funerals and divorce; religious education; 
and others. Of the religious services provided by the organizations, propagation of the faith 
(30.63%) and religious education (32.75%) are considered the two most important activities 
provided by them. The organizations were also asked to rank why they provided the religious 
services and frequently organizations provided more than one response. Among the various 
responses provided was that it was a virtuous thing to do (83.80%), the fact that others did 
not provide these services (16.02%), that they provided these services in response to 
provision by other organizations (33.10%), and that providing these services was a 
requirement for the area (41.20%). This is supported when we look at the breakdown by 
religion in Table 7 which shows that of the organizations admitting explicitly to provide 
religious services, propagation of the faith and religious education are the two main activities 
provided by all religions. The table also shows that Muslim and Christian organizations 
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provide more by way of religious education (39.5% of all Muslim organizations and 44% of 
all Christian organizations) which they rate as their main activity compared to the Hindus, for 
whom propagation of the faith (39% of all Hindu religious organizations) is ranked as the 
main reason why they provide religious services, with religious education being important 
but playing only a secondary role. 
 
 
Table 7.  Distribution of religious services provided by religion 
Religious Services 
Hindu Muslim Christian Other Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Propagation and 
expansion of faith 106 39.0 58 23.4 7 28.0 3 13.0 174 30.6
Weddings, funerals, 
divorce 16 5.9 31 12.5 3 12.0 3 13.0 53 9.3 
Religious education 69 25.4 98 39.5 11 44.0 8 34.8 186 32.7
Other religious 
services 8 2.9 4 1.6 0 0.0 5 21.7 17 3.0 
 
A key factor that we are interested in is how religious service provision may have changed 
before the economic liberalization of 1991 and in the period thereafter. Therefore, the 
organizations were also asked specifically about this. The organizations were asked to rank 
the four categories above in terms of their provision before and after 1991. The results of this 
are shown in Tables 8 and 9 below. 
Table 8. Provision of religious services before 1991 
Religious 
services 
Propagation of 
the faith 
Offering services like 
weddings or funerals 
Religious 
education 
Other 
services 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Rank1  140 24.6 11 1.9 22 3.9 
Rank2  23 4.0 116 20.4 189 33.3 
Rank3  4 0.7 23 4.0 4 0.7 
Service not 
mentioned 405 71.3 437 76.9 334 58.8 564 99.3
 
Table 9. Provision of religious services after 1991 
Religious 
services 
Propagation of 
the faith 
Offering services like 
weddings or funerals 
Religious 
education 
Other 
services 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Rank1  400 70.4 13 2.3 55 9.7 
Rank2  2 0.4 106 18.7 99 17.4 11 1.9 
Rank3  21 3.7 2 0.4 
Service not 
mentioned 166 29.2 449 79 393 69.2 555 97.7 
 
Tables 8 and 9 provide initial support for Proposition 1 that the religious organizations 
differentiate themselves on religious services. They show that before 1991, the organizations 
viewed their key religious services provided as mainly faith propagation and religious 
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education with the latter being the main religious service offered and a substantial number of 
organizations not viewing any of these activities are predominant. The situation is quite 
dramatically altered for the post-1991 period. Now propagation and expansion of the faith is 
regarded as the single major religious service provided with over 70% of organizations 
mentioning this. Religious education also continues to be important and the percentage of 
organizations mentioning this at rank 1 also increased for the post-1991 period from 
approximately 3% to 10%. About 20% of the organizations mentioned offering services such 
as weddings and funerals at rank 2, and which stayed approximately at the 20% level in both 
periods. 
Overall, in response to a question about this, there were as many as 539 organizations 
(94.89%) who felt that providing religious services increased the welfare of the population in 
their district, so the provision of religious services was unquestionably an important aspect of 
service provision by these organizations. 
5.2. Innovations to Religious Beliefs, Religious Services and Social Practice 
One of the main purposes of the survey was to ascertain contemporary practice but also to 
investigate innovations to religious beliefs and the provision of religious services. As a first 
step, the organizations were asked 'What elements in your belief system have received more 
emphasis from your organization, and which elements have received less emphasis?' The 
responses are shown in Table 10 below. 
Table 10. Changes in religious beliefs and practices 
 
Changes in religious beliefs and 
practices 
More emphasis 
Less 
emphasis 
Stayed the 
same Do not know 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Worship at place of worship 320 56.3 65 11.4 148 26.1 35 6.2 
Worship at home 237 41.7 144 25.4 139 24.5 48 8.5 
Women going to place of worship 177 31.2 98 17.3 218 38.4 75 13.2 
Belief in God 411 72.4 56 9.9 65 11.4 36 6.3 
Belief in Fate 238 41.9 183 32.2 82 14.4 65 11.4 
Spirituality 333 58.6 107 18.8 83 14.6 45 7.9 
Other 12 2.1 2 0.4 14 2.5 540 95.1 
 
The organizations responded that almost all aspects of their religious belief systems and 
practices have received more emphasis and this included both religious practices such as 
worship at places of worship, worship at home, and women going to places of worship; as 
also religious beliefs including those in God, fate and spirituality. Two aspects that some of 
the organizations believed received less emphasis was worship at home, and a belief in fate. 
This is one of the salient changes we found because Hinduism typically does not emphasize 
communal worship. In an effort to understand the evolution of religious services, we asked 
which social practices associated with the religion were newly adopted and which practices 
had been abandoned. The organizations’ responses are shown in Table 11 below. 
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Table 11. Changes in social practices 
Social Practices Adopted   Abandoned  
Stayed the 
same  
Do not 
know 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Caste 80 14.1 201 35.4 222 39.1 65 11.4 
Marriage within caste/biradari 138 24.3 144 25.4 223 39.3 63 11.1 
Later age at marriage 385 67.8 36 6.3 81 14.3 66 11.6 
Remarriage for men 394 69.4 18 3.2 97 17.1 59 10.4 
Remarriage for women 375 66 48 8.5 86 15.1 59 10.4 
Child marriage 13 2.3 434 76.4 55 9.7 66 11.6 
Dietary restrictions (e.g. 
vegetarianism) 130 22.9 179 31.5 177 31.2 82 14.4 
Untouchability 45 7.9 297 52.3 149 26.2 77 13.6 
Having more children 65 11.4 306 53.9 122 21.5 75 13.2 
Preferring to have boys rather than 
girls 29 5.1 336 59.2 119 21 84 14.8 
Other factors 4 0.7 1 0.2 6 1.1 557 98.1 
 
A closer look at Table 11 suggests that the influence of caste is either believed to be declining 
(35.39%), or staying the same (39.08%). Marriage within the caste is also viewed as staying 
the same. A majority of organizations think that a later age at marriage occurs (67.78%) and 
that remarriage for both men (69.37%) and women (66.02%) is widely acceptable. Child 
marriage is viewed almost uniformly as a practice that is being increasingly abandoned 
(76.41%). Untouchability was viewed as either having stayed the same (26.23%) or being 
increasingly abandoned (56.29%). As regards demographic matters, having large families 
was generally being abandoned (53.87%) and the organizations believed that son preference 
was being abandoned (59.15%) too. What is also interesting here though is the large number 
of organizations (20.95%) who believed that the latter had stayed the same. 
The organizations were also asked a qualitative question about whether in their opinion 
religious services now, compared to 20 years previously, were more traditional, less 
traditional, or had stayed the same. There were 238 organizations (41.9%) who reported that 
religious services overall were more traditional, compared to 209 organizations (36.8%) who 
said they were less traditional, while 112 organizations (19.72%) felt they had stayed the 
same. Their responses, broken down by religion, are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Comparison of new religious services provided in the last 20 years, by religion 
New 
Services 
Hindu Muslim Christian Other Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
More 
traditional 124 46.3 97 39.6 5 20.8 12 54.5 238 42.6 
Less 
traditional 78 29.1 111 45.3 13 54.2 7 31.8 209 37.4 
Stayed the 
same 66 24.6 37 15.1 6 25.0 3 13.6 112 20.0 
Very mild 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Not-
religion 
based 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 268 100.0 245 100.0 24 100.0 22 100.0 559 100.0 
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What is unusual is how many organizations of all religious persuasions argued that religious 
services had become more traditional rather than less traditional over time. This suggests that 
‘innovations’ to religious service provision are viewed as being more traditional even as 
wider changes in the economy are happening. This is also a uniform perception across all 
religions, although the percentages for the Hindus and Muslims are higher than for the 
Christians. This is consistent and provides some initial support for Proposition 1. 
However, what is also salient in this context is the difference between religious beliefs and 
religious practice, and the extent to which the capacity for innovation at the level of religious 
practice does exist. For example, some organizations telecast by internet wedding and 
cremation ceremonies in real time for overseas relatives and organised mass marriages for 
poor women. Another example, as one of our field staff commented: ‘There are two kinds of 
innovation - one at idea level and other at the planning level. Some of them even go to the 
extent that they are working only to show the true path of the religion. This means they would 
not tolerate any change in the religious belief. But practice is different. Most of the religious 
Muslim leaders would not preach for use of contraceptives as it will interfere in the God's 
area - that it is up to God to give you more children or less. Who are we to deny his blessing 
with more children! They are totally against abortion and would give religious decree 
against those who practice it. But the ground really is quite different. And they understand 
it…People across the religion are now going for less children, marriage at a later age is a 
common phenomenon these days and inter-caste and to some extent inter-religion marriage 
is also coming in vogue.’  
 
Our field staff believed that innovations to religious service provision also had to do with 
external changes such as market forces and globalization. They argue for example that the 
Hindu norm of 'kaala pani', a norm that a Hindu who crossed the seas would lose their caste 
and which prevented people from travelling overseas, was a norm which had more or less 
completely died out in response to globalization and cheap air travel. As one of our 
respondents argues, ‘Now very few religious people would preach for not to cross the seas. It 
is something unavoidable.’  The other area that Hindu respondents frequently cited as an 
example of a dying innovation was the end of the Sanskrit language as the lingua franca of 
the country. Muslim respondents pointed out that the use of images or pictures are prohibited 
in Islam but that no Islamic person could avoid them now in the increasingly media-
dominated world that both these institutions and individuals were now operating in. 
 
In summary, our study shows evidence of all religious organizations providing religious 
services, with some differences between them as regards their motivation to do so and actual 
provision, as well as changes in religious beliefs, service provision and social practice. 
 
5.3. Non-Religious Services  
 
There was also qualitative support for Proposition 2 that tried to assess religious competition 
in the context of non-religious service provision. There were a range of non-religious services 
provided by the organizations and in the survey they were asked if they provided services 
including education, health, employment, food distribution, child care or other services. Their 
responses are shown in Table 13. 
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Table 14. Distribution of non-religious services provided before and after 1991, by religion  
 
Non-religious services Hindu Muslim Christian Other Total Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Education  before 1991 89 32.72 174 70.16 20 80.0 11 47.83 294 51.76 
Education after 1991 108 39.71 202 81.45 20 80.0 12 52.17 342 60.21 
Health  before 1991 92 33.82 55 22.18 17 68.0 10 43.48 174 30.63 
Health  after 1991 124 45.59 88 35.48 18 72.0 10 43.48 240 42.25 
Employment before 1991 20 7.35 27 10.89 1 4.0 1 4.35 49 8.63 
Employment after 1991 25 9.19 34 13.71 1 4.0 1 4.35 61 10.74 
Food distribution before 1991 147 54.04 112 45.16 5 20.0 15 65.22 279 49.12 
Food distribution after 1991 163 59.93 137 55.24 5 20.0 15 65.22 320 56.34 
Child care before 1991 36 13.24 39 15.73 11 44.0 6 26.09 92 16.20 
Child care after 1991 45 16.54 60 24.19 12 48.0 7 30.43 124 21.83 
Other services before 1991 39 14.34 21 8.47 5 20.0 2 8.70 67 11.80 
Other services  after 1991 48 17.65 28 11.29 4 16.0 11 21.74 85 14.96 
Total 272  248  25  23  568  
 
Table 14 and Figure 4 show that although all religions are providing substantial education 
and health before and after 1991, one interesting aspect that this study has uncovered is that 
Hindus and Muslims are engaging more in providing education, health, employment services 
and food distribution services in the post-1991 period. For those who provide this, child care 
service provision has also increased very much in the post-1991 period.  
 
The religious variations are quite striking: The Hindus are mainly providing food distribution. 
The Muslims and Christians seem to provide the most education services and the Hindus are 
providing much less. The Christians provide education, health and child-care. What is 
prominent looking at this graph is why the Christian and Muslim organizations are providing 
so much more education than the Hindus? With the Christian organizations, many of them 
have been providing education through missionary and other activities since the colonial 
period, so this is not so surprising that we find this, although it is reassuring that we do. The 
fact that the Muslim organizations provide so much education is more unusual.  
 
Economists have long been arguing that in order to explain ethnic differences in schooling 
(whether in India or elsewhere), you need to look at factors both on the demand side and on 
the supply side. And in the Indian context, there have been concerns about discrimination in 
access to schooling for minority communities on the demand side, but also supply-side issues 
in education such as school quality, curricula, and so forth (Borooah and Iyer 2005). For 
example, Borooah and Iyer (2005) found that even after controlling for other individual, 
household and village-level characteristics, Muslims in India had lower primary school 
enrolment than Hindus. There is also some evidence that parents might send their children to 
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religious schools because for most religious schools such as madrasas, the cost of tuition and 
boarding is free. Another factor that might explain this finding is that non-religious services 
are structurally required in Islam through zakat.  
 
So one of the findings of our study is that religious organizations of all religions are 
providing more non-religious services. Table 15 shows the distribution of non-religious 
services by state in India. It shows that organizations in all states have increased their 
provision of non-religious services in the post-1991 period. Moreover, Table 15 also shows 
that the states which have poorer public provision like Uttar Pradesh are also the states in 
which the religious organizations are providing more. This is another key finding of the 
present study which is that the religious organizations are substituting non-religious services 
in order to compensate for the lack of state provision. This suggests, consistent with 
Propositions 1 and 2 in the model, that poverty and inequality might contribute significantly 
towards religious organization membership. 
Table 15. Distribution of non-religious services provided before and after 1991, by state 
Non-religious 
services 
Gujarat Jammu and Kashmir Karnataka Maharashtra 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
West 
Bengal 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Education   
before 1991 
40 45.5 50 61.0 29 38.7 19 24.4 29 38.7 76 82.6 51 65.4 
Education 
after 1991 
46 52.3 58 70.7 45 60.0 23 29.5 37 49.3 81 88.0 52 66.7 
Health before 
1991 
22 25.0 29 35.4 14 18.7 16 20.5 18 24.0 44 47.8 31 39.7 
Health  after 
1991 
29 33.0 43 52.4 33 44.0 20 25.6 29 38.7 49 53.3 37 47.4 
Employment 
before 1991 
8 9.1 7 8.5 0 0.0 1 1.3 5 6.7 24 26.1 4 5.1 
Employment 
after 1991 
10 11.4 7 8.5 3 4.0 2 2.6 7 9.3 28 30.4 4 5.1 
Food 
distribution 
before 1991 
46 52.3 41 50.0 23 30.7 20 25.6 57 76.0 42 45.7 50 64.1 
Food 
distribution  
after 1991 
53 60.2 45 54.9 28 37.3 22 28.2 62 82.7 51 55.4 59 75.6 
Child care 
before 1991 
12 13.6 11 13.4 6 8.0 2 2.6 17 22.7 27 29.3 17 21.8 
Child care 
after 1991 
14 15.9 23 28.0 8 10.7 4 5.1 24 32.0 33 35.9 18 23.1 
Other services 
before 1991 
20 22.7 14 17.1 1 1.3 5 6.4 2 2.7 13 14.1 12 15.4 
Other services  
after 1991 
20 22.7 16 19.5 1 1.3 5 6.4 2 2.7 20 21.7 21 26.9 
Total 88  82  75  78  75  92  78  
 
This is also supported by a more qualitative question in which in addition to direct questions 
about non-religious services provided, the organizations were also asked about possible 
religious motives for the provision of non-religious services. The organizations explained that 
the provision of non-religious services was a key way in which to propagate and to expand 
their faith - over 55% of organizations thought this was very important in the post-1991 
period, and this increased substantially relative to the pre-1991 period. This again is 
consistent with Propositions 1 and 2. With respect to the provision of non-religious services 
such as education and health services, the organizations were asked if they had changed their 
provision of non-religious services such as education and health-care: there were 331 
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(58.27%) who reported that they had. They were also asked if the education and health 
services were now better provided for, and the costs of providing these services. There were 
318 (55.99%) who thought these services were better provided for now, 69 (12.15%) who felt 
that they were less well provided for, and 101 (17.78%) who thought that the non-religious 
provision had stayed the same. There were 542 organizations (95.42%) who felt that 
providing these non-religious services increased the welfare of the population in their 
districts. 
Apart from the impact of their activities on the population, the organizations were then asked 
to subjectively evaluate what was the primary gain to them in providing these services: they 
were asked to rank the most significant benefits as shown in Table 16 below. 
Table 16. Primary gain by providing non-religious services 
Non-religious 
services 
Monetary 
contributions 
Religious adherents 
increase 
Political influence 
extended Other benefits 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Rank 1 37 6.5 79 13.9 1 0.2 0 0.0 
Rank 2 149 26.2 205 36.1 8 1.4 2 0.4 
Rank 3 73 12.9 99 17.4 13 2.3 7 1.2 
Service not 
mentioned 309 54.4 185 32.6 546 96.1 559 98.4 
Total 568 100.0 568 100.0 568 100.0 568 100.0 
 
With respect to other qualitative perceptions about innovations to non-religious service 
provision, most organizations either had introduced or were in the process of introducing 
computer education and computer-based learning schemes. Our field staff noted that while 
the main focus of non-religious service provision for most of the organizations was on 
education, yet many people were educationally backward in the key areas of operation of the 
organizations. More than 90% of the respondents said that Indians needed religious education 
more than any other service. Health-care provision was the second-most popular service 
provided after education. Organizations differed in terms of their target groups: for example, 
in Jammu and Kashmir the Muslim organizations were very clear that their target group was 
the welfare of their community. In other states religious institutions would make it a point to 
state that their organizations were open for everyone irrespective of religious denomination. 
There was little doubt that the religious organizations perceived themselves to be providing 
very important non-religious services for their communities. Many spoke of people having 
lost faith in the government and working for the uplift of their communities through their 
own local efforts. For example, Kashmiris both those who belonged to less fortunate 
economic backgrounds, and others spoke knowledgably and eloquently about basic issues of 
their lives and existence, and they were at pains to discuss these at considerable length. Also, 
the heads of most of the organizations in all the states did emphasize their secular outlook. 
So the bottom line is that all religions have increased their provision of all non-religious 
services, possibly to compensate for the lack of state provision, and that there are important 
variations among the religions in terms of the kinds of services they provide. 
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5.4. Economic Inequality and Religious Competition 
Some of the questions we asked in the survey were about subjective evaluations of inequality 
and poverty by the organizations. The survey asked a series of questions on how the 
organizations perceived background changes in the economy more widely. A series of 
questions ascertained the organizations' views about poverty and inequality. First, the 
organizations were asked, 'What are the most important economic changes that you think 
have happened?’ They provided a range of qualitative responses including that the area is 
now better developed, that awareness had increased, that there were better education and 
employment opportunities, that 'big malls and big shops have opened', that ‘Brahmins had 
become richer’, that 'everyone carries a mobile', that 'farmers are quitting farming', that there 
was an increase in real estate activity, but equally an increase in slum areas. Others pointed 
out that there was lots of development in the IT sector and that 'multistoryed buildings have 
come up' in addition to new roads and services and an 'increase in mall culture', but as one 
temple trustee appositely put it 'Mumbai has developed but Dharavi has not!' Others pointed 
out the positive aspects that 'Poor people can now manage two square meals a day.' 
Responses to questions on background economic and other changes provide qualitative 
support for Proposition 1. A majority of organizations agreed that there was an observable 
increase in income and overall standard of living of the general population. The overall sense 
about their economic status was that poverty had decreased but that economic inequality had 
increased. The perceived changes in income inequality are consistent with other studies 
which have commented recently on the increase in income inequality in the post-1991 
economic reform period in India (Sarkar and Mehta 2010). In terms of poverty, an estimate 
by the World Bank in 2005 showed that India had approximately 42% of its population living 
below the international poverty line of $1.25 a day (Chen and Ravallion 2008). 
 
In order to assess these changes more closely, the organizations were asked, 'How do you 
think the economic position of the population you serve has changed in the past 10 years?' A 
majority of the organizations believed that the economic position of the population that they 
were serving had become better (83.27%), followed by others who thought it had stayed the 
same (13.03%) and 3.5% who thought it had become worse. This is consistent with the 
qualitative observations as well.  
We then asked them questions about their perceptions of inequality such as ‘How do you 
think economic inequality has changed in your district over the past 20 years?’; ‘How do you 
think that poverty has changed in your district in the past 20 years?’; and ‘What are the most 
important economic changes that you think have happened in your area in the last 5 years?’ 
The responses in Table 17 show that a majority of the sample believed that economic 
inequality had either increased (46.13%) or stayed the same (21.83%). The split was not 
dissimilar across the various religious groups. A similar question on poverty yielded the 
responses shown in Table 18.  
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Table 17. Economic inequality in the last twenty years 
Economic inequality Freq. % 
Decreased  174 30.6 
Stayed the same  124 21.8 
Increased  262 46.1 
Do not know  8 1.4 
 
Table 18. Poverty in the last twenty years 
Poverty Freq. % 
Decreased 247 43.5 
Stayed the same 93 16.4 
Increased 225 39.6 
Do not know 3 0.5 
  
A majority of the organizations perceived that poverty had decreased (43.49%). What is 
striking is that while economic inequality is perceived to have increased, poverty is believed 
to have decreased over time. The finding from the previous section that non-religious service 
provision increased during a period when the perception of economic inequality increased is 
consistent with Proposition 2. 
We also assessed religious competition by asking organizations a range of questions about 
their knowledge of other organizations in the same geographical area. While not all the 
questions are reported in this paper, we highlight a couple of issues that are of interest to the 
research question posed by our theoretical model, particularly with respect to Proposition 2. 
Specifically, organizations were asked both about the number and size of other organizations 
operating in the same area. There were 150 organizations who reported 1-2 others; 136 who 
reported 3-5 competitors; 96 who reported 6-10; 74 who reported over 10 organizations as 
competitors; 112 who did not know their competition. In order to assess the size of the 
competition, the organizations were asked to state how many other organizations were bigger, 
smaller or the same size. The responses are shown in Table 19 below. 
Table 19. Reported size of other organizations in the same geographical area 
 Bigger organizations Same size organizations Smaller organizations  
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1 109 19.2 142 25.0 90 15.8 
2 63 11.1 53 9.3 76 13.4 
3 40 7.0 27 4.8 28 4.9 
4 21 3.7 12 2.1 26 4.6 
5 18 3.2 7 1.2 16 2.8 
6 7 1.2 3 0.5 4 0.7 
7 4 0.7   8 1.4 
8 1 0.2 2 0.4 4 0.7 
9     1 0.2 
10 2 0.4 1 0.2 2 0.4 
11 1 0.2 2 0.4   
Do not know 302 53.2 319 56.2 313 55.1 
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To complement the analysis in Table 19, another question that was asked was whether an 
organization had provided a new religious service because other organizations in their area 
had provided a new service. Many religious organizations said that they did provide a new 
service if others did so. It was the impression of our field staff that the organizations were 
more inclined to answer questions about other organizations that belonged to the same 
religion. As might be expected, all organizations described organizations of other religions as 
religiously stronger than themselves. In order to assess how different the organizations were - 
in effect, whether in keeping with our model, if the focal points of these organizations 
diverged at all - the organizations were asked to assess how different they were to other 
organizations working in the same district. They were asked to indicate differences on several 
dimensions: religious belief, religious services, education and health services, other services, 
manner of organization, service orientation. The responses, grouped by religion, are shown in 
Table 20. 
Table 20. Perceived differences between religious organizations in geographical vicinity 
 
Difference to 
Hindus 
Difference to 
Muslims 
Difference to 
Christians 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Different in terms of religious 
belief 203 35.7 99 17.4 107 18.8 
Different in terms of religious 
services provided 117 20.6 88 15.5 60 10.6 
Different in terms of education & 
health provided 56 9.9 77 13.6 84 14.8 
Different in terms of other 
services we provide 47 8.3 55 9.7 49 8.6 
Different in the way we are 
organized 37 6.5 103 18.1 73 12.9 
Different in terms of service 
orientation 15 2.6 35 6.2 61 10.7 
Did not respond  93 16.4 111 19.5 134 23.6 
 
In total, a large number of organizations mentioned other organizations that also provided 
non-religious services. The total number of other organizations that the organizations were 
aware of and mentioned was 914 providing educational services, 772 providing health, 105 
providing employment, 873 providing food distribution services, and 44 providing other 
services.   
In summary, the qualitative and descriptive statistics from the survey is consistent with and 
provides initial support for both Propositions 1 and 2 respectively. In the next section, we use 
our survey data to econometrically test Propositions 1 and 2 in order to demonstrate the 
empirical regularity of our findings. 
6. Econometric Testing of the Propositions 
The econometric analysis consists of testing the two propositions identified by the theoretical 
model.  
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Proposition 1. The two religious organizations maximize the differentiation in their religious 
focal points regardless of economic inequality in order to minimize competition in the 
provision of non-religious services. 
Proposition 2. When there is some economic inequality, if the poor remain poor enough, then 
both religious organizations will also provide more non-religious services. 
For Proposition 1, our dependent variable is the strength of religious beliefs. The independent 
variables used in the empirical analysis along with the variable definitions are shown in Table 
21.  
Table 21. Variable Definitions 
Variable name Variable definition 
orgrel Strength of religious beliefs 
impeduhth Changes in health and education services since 1991 ∈ ሼെ1, 0, 1ሽ 
econineq20 Whether economic inequality has changed over the last 20 years 
∈ ሼെ1, 0, 1ሽ 
adherents Number of adherents of the organization 
age Age of the organization 
Muslim Whether the organization is Muslim 
Christian Whether the organization is Christian 
Hindu Whether the organization is Hindu 
Gujarat Whether the state is Gujarat 
Jammu and Kashmir Whether the state is Jammu & Kashmir 
Maharashtra Whether the state is Maharashtra 
Karnataka Whether the state is Karnataka 
Uttar Pradesh Whether the state is Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal Whether state is West Bengal 
 
These variables include a range of religion and state effects, the age of the organizations, the 
number of adherents for the organization, and perceptions of whether an increase in 
inequality had been observed. 
Let us consider first Proposition 1 which states that the two religious organizations maximize 
the differentiation in their religious focal points regardless of economic inequality, in order to 
minimize competition in the provision of non-religious services. 
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alternatives, it cannot indicate the direction of deviation from the null. This is their primary 
reason for recommending the LR test in this scenario. 
We report the results of our tests on the dependent variable (the strength of religious beliefs) 
in Tables 22 without covariates and in Table 23 with covariates. 
Table 22. Goodness of fit tests on the dependent variable (without covariates) 
Goodness-of-fit test  
 Statistic p-value 
Pearson's χ² 154.9 0.0064 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) 162.1537 0.0054 
Cressie-Read 156.1762 0.0062 
Freeman-Tukey 170.0932 0.0046 
 
Based on the positive and significant LR test statistic, we conclude that religious 
organizations are dispersed more widely than would be expected if they were choosing their 
ideologies independently of each other. This suggests that religious organizations in India 
are choosing to maximize the differences in their ideology with respect to other 
organizations.  
We generalize the above tests to their conditional (on covariates) versions. The theoretical 
extension is not straightforward and the relevant theory is derived in Andrews (1988a, 1988b) 
and Vuong and Wang (1993). The key aspect of testing conditional fit lies in the construction 
of appropriate data-dependent cells for the tests.  The Andrews method relies on the ability to 
construct data-dependent cells which are chosen from a Vapnik-Cervonenkis class of sets. 
Several ways are suggested in Andrews (1988) which involve various combinations of 
appropriately discretized outcome and covariates; since our outcome variable is naturally 
categorical, we use k-means clustering to split the covariates into categories independently 
for each category of the outcome variable. The predicted probabilities for these cells are then 
compared with the cell counts, and an independent nonparametric bootstrap is used to 
generate p-values for these statistics.  
Details of an asymptotic ߯ଶ-distribution are given in Andrews (1998a, b), but we compute 
them using the bootstrap, the relevant theory for which is given in Vuong and Wang (1993).  
Predicted probabilities are obtained by fitting a multinomial logit model by maximum 
likelihood. 
Table 23. Goodness-of-fit tests (with covariates) 
Goodness-of-fit Test  
 Statistic p-value 
Pearson's χ² 124.4 0.003 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) 136.2 0.0021 
Cressie-Read 127.3 0.0029 
Freeman-Tukey 147.05 0.0011 
 
We note that the results are not substantially qualitatively altered and we conclude that the 
dispersion of religiosity is robust to the inclusion of covariates in the model. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of the Intensity of Beliefs among Religious Organizations, by range of 
Non-Religious Services provided 
 
 
 
 
In order to refine and test the final part of Proposition 1 on competition effects, we estimate 
Ordered Logit regressions. These Ordered Logit regressions are estimated with and without 
state and religion fixed effects to examine whether competition between organizations in the 
provision of a service also affects the distribution of the intensity of religious beliefs. We 
report the marginal effects for the Ordered Logit regression which shows whether an 
organization’s religiosity is affected by whether there are other religious organizations in the 
area whose service-provision affects the decision of the organization. As Tables 24 and 25 
show, the marginal effect of a religious organization having an effect on another 
organization’s service provision positively affects the probability of an organization being 
more strong in its strength of religious beliefs. And it affects the probability of being a less 
religious organization negatively. As Tables 24 and 25 show, this effect is robust to the 
inclusion of state and religion fixed effects. 
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Table 24. Marginal Effects for the Ordered Logit Model with fixed effects 
 
Average change in the strength of religious 
belief 
 
Provide a new service because others do so 
Prob (orgrel = Very Mild) 
 
-0.0614*** 
 
(0.006) 
Prob (orgrel = Mild) 
 
-0.0821* 
 
(0.004) 
Prob (orgrel = Strong) 
 
-0.0237** 
 
(0.056) 
Prob (orgrel = Very Strong) 
 
0.1671*** 
 
(0.003) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
 
 
Table 25. Marginal Effects for the Ordered Logit Model without fixed effects 
 
Average change in the strength of religious 
belief 
 
Provide a new service because others do so 
Prob (orgrel = Very Mild) 
 
-0.0449** 
 
(0.036) 
Prob (orgrel = Mild) 
 
-0.0643** 
 
(0.029) 
Prob (orgrel = Strong) 
 
-0.0291** 
 
(0.045) 
Prob (orgrel = Very Strong) 
 
0.1383** 
 
(0.025) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
 
Together therefore our results provide support for Proposition 1 that the religious 
organizations are maximizing the differentiation in their ideology on the religious spectrum in 
order to minimize the competition on non-religious services, regardless of economic 
inequality.  
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6.2. Non-religious Service Provision and Economic Inequality 
 
Proposition 2 states that when there is some economic inequality, if the poor remain poor 
enough, then both religious organizations will also provide more non-religious services. To 
test Proposition 2 we use a range of models such as the Ordered Logit model, which we 
estimate with and without fixed effects. First, we use an Ordered Logit model with the 
variable changes in health and education services since 1991 as the outcome variable. Our 
primary independent variable of interest is the perception of inequality. In all the 
specifications below, we include the age and the number of adherents of the religious 
organizations as covariates. The fit and the coefficients of the Ordered Logit model are 
obtained. To interpret this model, we calculate the marginal effect of a change in the 
variables of interest on the outcome. These are tabulated in Table 26. Note that the results in 
each row are from a separate regression and are presented with their goodness-of-fit statistics. 
 
Table 26 has straightforward interpretations. It shows the average changes or first differences 
in the probability of providing either more, less or the same amount of education and health 
services when the perception of economic inequality changes from one category to the other. 
It demonstrates a Markov transition matrix, i.e., a matrix of change in probabilities of the 
outcome for a transition of perception of inequality from one category to the other. So for 
example in Table 27, the average probability of providing more education and health services 
increases by 0.2495 if an organization perceives inequality to have increased rather than it 
having stayed the same. Similarly, the probability of providing less education and health 
services decreases by -0.1298 when inequality increases.  These are also economically 
meaningful numbers, i.e. the changes in probabilities are fairly substantial. The results for the 
case of increased inequality are all significant at the 1 percent level of significance. This 
provides support for Proposition 2 since we observe a consistent relationship between non-
religious services increasing when there is some inequality. 
 
The Ordered Logit model, however, imposes the restrictive proportional odds assumption, 
which implies that the coefficient of interest is the same for all the cut-off points. The Brant 
test tests a fundamental restriction of the Ordered Logit model, whereby the regression 
coefficients are restricted to be equal across choices. The Brant test is used to check whether 
this assumption holds in this case, and at the 5% level of significance this test rejects the null 
of proportional odds. Therefore, we re-estimate our model in two more ways to check if our 
results are robust to dropping the proportional odds assumption. The Multinomial Logit 
model is more general but ignores the ordering in the response variable. The average 
marginal effects for this model are reported in Table 27. 
One disadvantage of the Multinomial Logit model is that it is overparameterised in that it 
allows all variables to vary over all categories. The Generalised Ordered Logit model as 
described in Williams (2006) allows for certain covariates to violate the proportional odds 
assumptions, which are decided on the basis of a backward stepwise selection using LR-tests. 
This has the advantage of parsimony, but the final chosen model is fairly arbitrary. The 
average marginal effects for this model are reported in Table 28. 
Both the Multinomial Logit and the Generalised Ordered Logit model provide support for the 
proposition that non-religious services increase in the presence of some inequality. Therefore, 
overall, we find strong support for Proposition 2: The average change in the probability of 
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providing higher levels of education and health services for an increase in the perception of 
inequality changes little across all the models, and remains large, positive and significant.   
 
Table 26. Marginal Effects for the Ordered Logit Model 
 
 Change in inequality 
Average change in probability of providing 
education and health services  
Stayed the same to 
Increased 
Decreased to 
Increased 
Prob (impeduhth = Better provided for) 0.2495*** 0.2817*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.1300*** Prob (impeduhth = Stayed the same) -0.1196*** 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Prob (impeduhth = Less well provided for) -0.1298*** -0.1517*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
 
Table 27.  Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model 
 Change in inequality 
Average change in probability of providing 
education and health services 
Stayed the same to 
Increased 
Decreased to 
Increased 
Prob (impeduhth = Better provided for) 0.2962*** 0.2636*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Prob (impeduhth = Stayed the same) -0.2539*** -0.1144** 
(0.000) (0.015) 
Prob (impeduhth = Less well provided for) -0.0422 0.1492** 
 (0.419) (0.011) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
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Table 28. Marginal effects for the Generalized Ordered Logit Model 
 Change in inequality 
Average change in probability of providing 
education and health services 
Stayed the same to 
Increased 
Decreased to 
Increased 
Prob (impeduhth = Better provided for) 0.2967*** 0.2696*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Prob (impeduhth = Stayed the same) -0.2543*** -0.1332** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Prob (impeduhth = Less well provided for) -0.0424 -0.1364* 
 (0.470) (0.001) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
In summary, the regressions collectively support the proposition that the religious 
organizations maximize the differentiation of their religious position, and that more non-
religious services are provided as inequality is perceived to increase. 
6.3. Robustness of Results 
To check the robustness of our results, the Ordered Logit models were re-estimated with state 
and religion fixed effects, shown in Tables 29 and 30. This is important to make sure that the 
results are not confounded by characteristics of the particular states surveyed. The excluded 
categories for the fixed effects are the state ‘Madhya Pradesh’ and ‘Other Religions’. The 
Ordered Logit results did not change qualitatively in the fixed effects estimation. Similarly, 
the Multinomial Logit results are still significant. All estimation results are reported with 
clustered robust standard errors, with clusters being interactions of state and religion 
categories, using the clustering strategies put forward by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 
(2010)8. What this suggests is that even with the inclusion of state and religion fixed effects, 
the organizations provide more non-religious services when inequality is perceived to 
increase. 
So, what we find is that the average change in the probability of providing higher levels of 
education and health services for an increase in the perception of inequality remains large, 
significant and positive. So if organizations perceived that inequality had increased, they also 
said that education and health services were better provided for. The empirical testing of the 
two propositions indicate that in keeping with the predictions of our theory, organizations are 
differentiating themselves on the religious spectrum - some religious organizations in India 
are positioning themselves as more radical, others more liberal. But regardless of this 
position, as economic inequality increases, all organizations provide more education and 
health services.  
                                                            
8 These strategies are for clustering standard errors in the ordered logit model on two non-nested clusters 
simultaneously. We have also estimated the logit models with the clustering done only on states, and only on 
religions, and our results show even greater significance for the variables of interest, but we report the results 
with clustering based on the more stringent interactions of state and religion only. 
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Table 29. Marginal Effects for the Ordered Logit Model with fixed effects 
 
 Change in inequality 
Average change in probability of providing 
education and health services 
Stayed the same to 
Increased 
Decreased to 
Increased 
Prob (impeduhth = Better provided for) 0.1043* 0.0943* 
(0.072) (0.075) 
Prob (impeduhth = Stayed the same) -0.445* -0.0408 
(0.077) (0.110) 
Prob (impeduhth = Less well provided for) -0.0597* -0.0535* 
 (0.082) (0.057) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
 
Table 30.  Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model with fixed effects 
 Change in inequality 
Average change in probability of providing 
education and health services 
Stayed the same to 
Increased 
Decreased to 
Increased 
Prob (impeduhth = Better provided for) 0.1433** 0.0739 
(0.022) (0.155) 
Prob (impeduhth = Stayed the same) -0.1399*** -0.0403 
(0.000) (0.384) 
Prob (impeduhth = Less well provided for) -0.0034 -0.0335 
 (0.954) (0.427) 
Note: p-value reported in parentheses 
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7. Conclusion 
Consider this view from the field - 'Yahan bhukha jagtaa hai par koi bhukha sota nahi' 
translated as ‘People wake up on an empty stomach here but no one will go to bed on an 
empty stomach’. And so the words of a Sufi scholar discussing the practice of ‘langar’ or the 
community kitchen of his mosque, which undertakes a community feeding programme, 
epitomises the vital nature of non-religious service provision by religious organizations in 
India today. If we examine the history of India's religions, all of them - Hinduism, Islam, 
Jainism, and Buddhism arose in response to the perceived inequalities in society and by a 
desire on the part of those propagating the religion to deal with the social problems which 
emerged in various historical periods. Such lessons underlie the crucial role of the socio-
economic consequences of religiosity and service provision which has played a key role in 
the operations of Indian religious organizations in the past. 
This paper has examined the economics of religion in India in the present. In particular, we 
highlight innovations to the provision of religious and non-religious services such as 
education and health by religious organizations as a way of retaining adherents in a situation 
where economic growth and income inequality are both increasing. To illustrate this 
theoretically, we presented a simple and stylised Hotelling-style model in which two religious 
organizations choose a religious focal point and decide upon the non-religious services 
provided. We showed in the model two central predictions: First, that the organizations will 
position themselves at opposite locations to differentiate themselves on the religious 
spectrum. Second, that in equilibrium, economic inequality alone is sufficient to make both 
organizations increase their provision of non-religious services. The remainder of the paper 
set about presenting qualitative and quantitative data on religious and non-religious service 
provision in India, and testing the two central propositions. 
To examine the issue empirically, we present our unique primary survey data that we  
collected from 2006-2008 in India on 568 Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Jain religious 
organizations spread across 7 major Indian states in what is to the best of our knowledge the 
first large-scale economic survey of religious organizations in India. We find evidence that 
organizations of all religions in India have substantially increased their provision of religious 
and especially non-religious services possibly in order to substitute for the lack of state 
provision, and that this is related to their perception of economic inequality and poverty. With 
economic growth, even with a reduction in the absolute levels of poverty, as more people 
become better-off they increasingly demand more non-religious services. So if growth also 
generates greater income inequality, then this can lead to a greater demand for non-religious 
service provision. Moreover, states in which we find greater non-religious service provision 
by religious organizations are also those in which public provision is less good.  
Using our theoretical model and testing the two key propositions from it on our survey data, 
we highlight that religious organizations in India are choosing to maximize the differences in 
their ideology with respect to other organizations, creating the potential for religious 
innovation. This is also consistent with our theoretical model which suggests that in 
equilibrium religious organizations will maximize the differentiation in their religious focal 
points. The distribution of religious beliefs is positively skewed. Using a range of 
econometric methods that included Ordered Logit and Multinomial Logit models on these 
religion data, we also showed that the average change in the probability of providing higher 
levels of education and health services for an increase in the perception of inequality changes 
little across all the models, and remains large, positive, significant and robust.   
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Our study also highlights variations between religions both in religious service provision and 
in non-religious service provision. For example, of all the religious services provided by the 
organizations, propagation of the faith and religious education are considered the two most 
important activities provided by them. Muslim and Christian organizations provided more by 
way of religious education which they rate as their main activity compared to the Hindus, for 
whom propagation of the faith is ranked as the main reason why they provide religious 
services, with religious education being important but playing only a secondary role. For the 
post-1991 period, propagation and expansion of the faith is regarded as the single major 
religious service provided with over 70% of organizations mentioning this. The econometric 
analysis also lent strong support to the view that religious organizations in India are choosing 
to maximize the differences in their ideology with respect to other organizations. 
In the context of non-religious services, for example by looking at the distribution of non-
religious services by religion and by region, shows that all religions have increased their 
provision of all non-religious services in the post-1991 period. Although all religions are 
providing substantial education and health before and after 1991, this study has uncovered 
that Hindus and Muslims are engaging much more in providing more education, health, 
employment services and food distribution services in the post-1991 period. There are also 
differences across Hindus, Muslims, Christians and others in the non-religious services 
provided. In keeping with the predictions of our model, the provision of all non-religious 
services has increased without exception. Another aspect is how innovative many religious 
organizations are with respect to the kinds of non-religious services they are providing - be it 
basic school education, health-care including blood donation, vaccination and eye camps, 
computer-based learning schemes, food distribution, cow-lending schemes, mass marriages, 
religious book distribution, or HIV/AIDS awareness programmes.  
What does emerge is that religious organizations all across India, and irrespective of religion, 
are playing a very important role in local communities by providing education, health, or 
other schemes. And this is a very positive role that many of them are playing in their 
communities, by contributing both religiously and to non-religious activities that both build 
social capital and address economic necessity.  
We are hopeful that the outcome of our research will have considerable policy relevance for 
the management of religiously pluralistic populations in developing countries. Economists 
are interested in the relationship between economic growth and religious conflict. Our study 
might be able to contribute to understanding this relationship better because with economic 
growth it could be that because religious organizations are differentiating themselves more 
religiously, this sets up the potential for greater conflict, which could possibly be mitigated 
by the same organizations also providing more non–religious services.  
What is clear is that emerging economies today are experiencing appreciable modern 
economic growth, yet this is coterminous with the increasing resilience of religious 
institutions. And this dichotomy between the sacred and the secular perhaps underlies how 
the existence of economic inequality makes for more religious and non-religious service-
provision by religious organizations. We believe that economics has much to offer the study 
of religion in developing countries like India, and perhaps can elucidate how a more 
prosperous economy may exist equally with more resilient religious organizations. 
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